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MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS IN AN 
OIL BASED ECONOMY: SAUDI ARABIA 
Robert E. l,ooney * 
~ INTRODUCTION 
Despite Saudi Arabia's many unique economic institutions, macroeconomic 
equilibrium must be established there just as is the case for any more developed (or 
underdeveloped for that matter) economy. The particular adjustment mechanisms 
that operate to eliminate disequilibrium are of special interest because alternative 
adjustment mechanisms may have different impacts on the subsequent path of 
economic growth. 
The portfolio adjustment estimates developed below should provide a new 
perspective on the growth mechanisms of the country. Of particular interest is the 
manner in which adjustments in the supply and demand for money have tended to 
~ move over time. 
DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Money is a stock, and since expectations play a role in portfolio adjustments of 
individuals (more specifically wealthy holders), the speed at which.actual portfolios 
are adjusted to desired levels should determine variations in the Kingdom's real 
stock of money. It is highly likely that the adjustment of money holdings of in-
dividual Saudis can be made only partially in each period because of lack of infor-
mation on their part concerning developments in the econmy, inertia, and the costs 
involved in making adjustments<O. Furthermore (if as is likely to be the case) the 
desired money balances of Saudis should depend on expected (or permanent) in-
come or other expected values of certain variables, it would take time for them to 
revise their expectations in light of the economic conditions they were currently ex-
periencing(2). 
It is also quite likely that individuals in Saudi Arabia, given their long run desired 
money balance and their money balance position in the previous period (year), 
• 
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would attempt to minimize the costs associated with their current money balance 
position(3). In this case, the costs involved would consist of those required in altering 
portfolios and those asssociated with being out of equilibrium. 
The first are commonly referred to as transactions costs and usually increase with 
changes in money balances<4>. The second are those of foregone yields on assets or 
the cost increased illiquidity and risks (depending upon whether the current money 
balance position exceeds or falls short of the desired position for the same period). 
It is usually felt that these costs increase with the discrepancy between the in-
dividual's desired and actual portfolio position. They can be depicted as: 
(I) M = ML + a(MD - ML) 
where ML = actual money supply lagged one year; MD = the amount of money 
currently demanded; a is assumed to have a value between one and zero and 
represents the speed of adjustment(5) between the actual and desired values. 
The expectation lag on the other hand can be thought of as a function of the an-
ticipated value of a certain variable (such as income) and the actual value of the 
previous period. It also includes a component based on the error made in previous 
forecasts. In other words, in each period, the expectation of Saudis is likely to be 
revised in proportion to the size of error committed in he expectation made during 
the previous period. For example in the case of income expectations, this error 
learning mechanism can be expressed as:(6). 
(2) YE = YEL.1 + b(Y - YELi) 
where YE = a measure of expected income; YELi = expected income last year; Y 
= actual income in the current time period; b = the average change in expectation 
and takes a value from zero to one. 
Empirical evidence to date for other countries suggests that the speed of adjust-
ment in expectation depends primarily on the costs associated with inaccurate in-
formation and the individual's attitude toward risks. It is argued by many writers 
that this lag can be ignored in developing countries. Presumably because both 
uncertainties and risks tend to be high in these areas(7> . .However, it seems just as 
logical to argue that if in fact the majority of entrepreneurs and households in those 
countries have higher uncertainties and are greater risk averters, there could be a 
ralatively longer expectation lag (i.e. smaller b), particularly as the risk averters act 
I. ?. \11: 
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·, 
in a conservative manner in adjusting their portfolios. ~ 
Clearly the existence of either lag and their lengths in Saudi Arabia should be 





tion was specified as directly related to expected income (YE) and inversely related 
to the expected degree of credit restraint (CR) and the expected rate of inflation 
(INF) or 
M = d(YE) - c(CRE) - d(INF). 
Here credit restraint was defined as the ratio of private credit to non-oil income<B>. 
It has a negative sign because it is likely that when commercial bank credit is 
tightened, individuals conserve on their money balances, whereas in periods of easy 
credit, they may keep excess balances (because of their low opportunity costs) . 
Inflation was defined as the rate of inflation in the previous year minus the rate of 
inflation in the year prior to that. (9). 
If we assume that money holders have identical expectations with respect to in-
come, inflation and the degree of credit restraint then the demand for money can be 
expressed00) as: 
M = [(1-a) + (1-b)ML - (1-a) (l-b)ML2 + abc(CR) - abd(INF) + abe(Y)] 
If only the demand adjustment lag is operative, then the actual value of a and b 
must be O<a <l and b = 1. In this case the above equation becomes: 
M = (1-a)ML + abY - ab(CR) - ab(INF) + aeY 
If only the expectation lag exists, then b must be greater then 0 but less than 
(0 <b < 1) and a = 1. 
In this case the equation becomes: 
M = (1-a) + (1-b)ML - (1-a) (l-b)ML2 + beY - bc(CR) - bd(INF) 
It is clear that if neither lag exists, then the equation reduces to 
M = eY - c(CR) - d(INF) 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient of t~e lagged money 
is a demand for money function, and can therefore be used to evaluate the existence 
and length of either the expectation lag or the demand adjustment lag. 
When money lagged for one and two periods are both introduced in the function, 
the coefficients can be used to measure both lags. 
The results (equation 1 - 3) for variot!s specifications of the demand for money 
function indicate the possibility of the existence of both lags; i.e.: 
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(I) M = 0.826 (ML) - 0.215(ML2) + 0.373 (GDPN)- 0.54 (CR)-
(3.27) (-1.00) (8.4) (-2.90) 
b = 0.174; a = 0.260; r2 = 0.9989; DW = 2.663 
0.034 (INF) 
(-1.67) 
(2) M = 0.829 (ML) - 0.483 (ML2) + 0.628 (GDPN) - 0.038 (CR) - 0.028 (INF) 
(2.63) (-2.03) (6.67) (-1.71) (-1.17) 
b = 0.172; a = 0.583; r2 = 0.9984; DW = 2.533 
(3) M = 0.369 (ML) - 0.245 (ML2) + 0.860 (DAN) - 0.043 (CCR) - 0.030 (INF) •• :=:.~ (2.07) (-1.92) (14.31) (-3.88) (2.86) ~ 
b = 0.631; a = 0.388; r2 = 0.9996; DW = 2.302 
where CR = private credit/nominal non-oil income; INF = rate of inflation, (t) 
-rate of infaltion (L). All coefficients are in: standardized (Beta) values. 
The results give interesting insights into Saudi portfolio behaviour. Apparently, 
while it is costly for individuals in the Kingdom to be out of equilibrium, it is also 
costly for them to make adjustments to restore equilibrium. Apparently, deficien-
cies in their money holdings imply excessive holdings of other assets. The costs 
associated with restoration of equilibrium must, therefore, depend (among other 
things) on liquidity and the ease of convertibility of other assets. 
We know that because of Islamic codes and the lack of government debt, there 
are few financial assets available. Most assets other than cash would be real 
(physical such as land, gold, etc.). The d'eficient financial structure, therefore, may 
explain the somewhat slow portfolio adjustment process observed during this 
period. 
To summarize, if the speed of adjustment depends on adjustment costs, it will 
take longer for wealth holders in Saudi Arabia than in most countries to adjust their 
money holdings (i.e. a smaller value of a) because nearly all other components in 
their portfolio are dominated by real assets. Clearly, it takes an individual more 
time to make a land or a house transfer than to make a switch between a checking 
account and a savings account. 
Our results are, therefore, contrary to the assertion made by many writers that 
monetary lags are negligible in countries where there is a lack and variety of finan-
cial assets. The Saudi tradition and willingness to substitute real assets for money is 





The most interesting monetary pattern is the acceleration in the growth rate of the 
money supply (M 1) after 1971. While the annual growth rate was 10.1 percent over 
the period 1960-1971, it rose sharply to about 43 percent in 1972, 40 percent in 1973, 
and 41 percent in 1974, reaching a peak of nearly 90 percent in 1975. Over the 
1972-79 period, the average annual growth rate of Ml was 46.5 percent.00. 
Equally interesting is the observation that the monetary stock series closely 
resembles that of high powered money--the monetary base (MB): 
(4) Ml = 1.17MB + 0.36 
(70.93) (1.50) 
r2 = 0.9972; F = 5030.88; OW = 1.7036 
The relationship between the money stock and the monetary base is an important 
one. In the next chapter projections of the growth in the money supply are made 
from estimates of the likely growth of the monetary base. 
The most important component of the supply of money base in Saudi Arabia is 
clearly the level of foreign reserves. During the 1960-77 period, the minimum con-
tribution of foreign reserves to the monetary base was 125.76 (1960). While in 1974 
this source rose to 1, 178 .50 percent. Until 1971 there is a rather stable pattern with 
foreign assets contributing on the ayerage 232.56 percent to the monetary base. This 
stability was apparently disturbed by a number of factors including the oil price in-
creases in 1973-74. 
The public sector component of the monetary base consists of the net claims of 
SAMA over government. Since the government did not borrow from SAMA during 
the 1960-79 period02), this figure was negative, indicating that government deposits 
exceeded the stock of government liabilities with SAMA. In the accounting sense, 
therefore, SAMA became an increasing net debtor to the government. 
This process began with the introduction of the government's stabilization pro-
gram in June 1958, the liquidation of the debt received priority. Although complete 
data for that period are not available, it is clear that through fiscal 1961 the 
budgeted increase in expenditures was held well below the anticipated increase in 
revenues. In addition, by early 1960 the government had repaid virtually all of its 
debt to SAMA; by the end of 1961 prhctically all the internal debt had been li-
quidated and a beginning had been made in repayment of the external debt03). 
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As noted oil revenues affect both the domestic and external components of the 
money base.04). Any changes in oil revenue will change government revenues, 
thereby changing the net position of the government with SAMA. Because oil 
revenues are denominated in dollars, a change in this figure 'Yill also produce a 
similar change in the foreign reserves of the bank. 
The relationship between oil revenues, government deposits, and the monetary 
base distinguishes the Saudi Arabian economy from most developing countries. In 
the usual case, the private sector is the main or sole recipient of export earnings. 
Given relatively fixed exchange rates, these earnings increase the foreign assets of 
the central bank. They will also have a direct and equal expansionary effect on the 
supply of bank reserves (and hence on the supply of money). 
Because the government is the main recipient of export earnings in Saudi Arabia, 
there is not a direct link between foreign exchange earnings, changes in foreign 
reserves of the central bank, and changes in money base. The remifications of the 
Kingdom's unique monetary situation are seen most directly in the manner in which 
the country's money supply is determined, and are best understood by examining 
the consolidated balance sheet of government and SAMA. 
From the liability side of this consolidated balance sheet, one can obtain a rela-
tionship describing the use of the monetary base (MB)05): 
(a) MB = SCOB + LRD + ERB 
where SCOB = currency in the hands ·of the public; LRB = legal reserves of the 
commercial banks, and ERB represents the excess reserves of these banks. 
Correspondingly, from the asset side of the consolidated balance sheet the sources 
of the monetary base can be identified as: 
(b) MB= SFA + GNAC + BAC + EAC 
where SFA = foreign assets held by SAMA less the loans and credits received from 
abroad; GNAC = claims on the government less the government deposits with 
SAMA; BAC = SAMA's advance and rediscounts to the commercial banks; EAC 
= other items on the asset side less the import registration deposits of the private 
sector and contingent liabilities. 
The items of the balance sheet have been rearranged to reflect the separate com-
ponents of the monetary base. In this regard: it is important to distinguish between 





the internal sources (which depend on the government's budgetary position and the 
commercial bank's borrowing from SAMA. 
External sources of the monetary base consists mainly of SAMA's net foreign 
asset holdings (SF A) which in turn depend essentially on the country's balance of 
payments position over time and is reflective of transactions in both the current and 
capital accounts. 
Under the system of fixed (or pegged) exchange rates, the balance of payments 
acts as a constraint on the country's supply of monetary base. The exact way in 
which the situation in· the balance of payments affects the changes in SAMA's 
foreign assets is: 
(c) A SFA = FCOB + A (FLB - FAB) + A (FLG - FAG) 
where FOCB denotes the current account balance, (FLB - F AB) represents the net 
foreign liability of the banks, (FLG - F AB) is equal to the net foreign government 
debt ( Ais the yearly difference) . 
In deriving these relationships, it is implicitly assumed that the non-bank public in 
Saudi Arabia does not hold foreign assets or incur foreign liabilities. It is also 
assumed that private corporations do not issue securities or bonds to foreigners. 
These assumptions are indeed justifiable because of the very initial stages of capital 
market development in the Kingdom. 
The balance of payments on curre~t (FCOB) is equal to the total exports of goods 
and services minus imports of goods and services. In Saudi Arabia where oil is the 
major export and the dominant source of Gross Domestic Product, the level of im-
ports can be safely assumed to be dependent on their level, or: 
(d) FCOB = aGORFS + b 
where GORFS denotes oil revenues and a and bare constant parameters. 
The internal components of the monetary base consist of the government debt 
(when rarely incurred) to SAMA, GNAC, and the banks borrowing form SAMA. 
Because the bond market is insignificant, the government's rare deficits were 
financed mainly through increases in the government debt with SAMA (GNAC). In 
theory the government could also have placed securities either abroad (FLG - FAG) 
' or with the banks (BLG - BAG); i.e., 
(e) GDFICIT = A GNAC + A (FLG - PAB) + A (BLG - BAG) 
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where GDFICIT denotes the government deficit. 
The government deficit itself is defined here as government expenditure, 
GENAN, minus government revenue, GRFS, (being composed of oil revenue, 
GORFS, and non-oil revenue, GNORFS: 
(f) GDFICIT = GENAN - GORFS - GNORFS 
The manner in which oil revenue affects the monetary base is Saudi Arabia is seen 
best through an examination of the adjusted monetary base (BA) defined as: 
(g) BA = B - (FLB - FAB) - BAC - EAC 
The advantage of analyzing BA as a means of detemining the money,supply pro-
cess in Saudi Arabia is that it is comprised only of items not influenced by the 
commercial banks. 
Substituting for B from equation (b) yields: 
(h) BA = SFA + GNAC - (FLB - FAB) 
Taking the differences and substituting for SFA and GNAC from equations (e) and (c) 
and utilizing equations (d) and (f), we obtain an expression which defines the 
change in the adjusted monetary base as a function of oil revenue and government 
expenditure, or: 
(i) ABA = (a-1-x)GORFA + (1-x)(GENAN-GNORFS) + (b-y) 
It follows from equation (h) that the way that the oil revenue affects the change in 
the adjusted monetary base depends on two parameters a and x. For oil revenues to 
have a positive impact on the monetary base, all that is required is for a ~(1-x). 
What might seem as a contradiction in terms would be the reverse situation where 
a A (1-x) would result in oil revenues having a negative influence on the money base. 
Estimation yields: 
(5)ABA = -1.49 - 0.06986GORFS + 0.48(GENAN - GNDRFS) 
(I 1.65) (0.89) 
r2 = 0.95 
implying a value of 0.411 for x and 0.520 for z. 
Further, since (1-z) = 0.48, oil revenues- in fact had a negative impact on the 
change in the money base. 
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.. The values for x and z are realistic since from the equations 
COB = (x) GORFS + b 
(6) COB = -2.07 + 0.66GORFS 
(11. 79) r2 = 0.91 
and 
AGENAN = (z) GDFICIT + a 
(7) AGENAN = 0.58 -t 0.76GDFICIT 
#Ct:.··· (7.72) r2 = 0.80 
.. 
• 
Again, it seems somewhat paradoxical to argue that incresed oil revenues would 
actually reduce the money base. Looked at in terms of the relationship~s individually 
depicted by x and z, however, the result is plausible; z can be interpreted as the pro-
portion of the government surplus (deficit) which is deposited either with SAMA or 
the commercial banking system. 
Due to the attractiveness of foreign investments, we would expect z to be 
somewhat less than one. On the other hand, z can be interpreted as the marginal 
impact of oil revenue on the current account balance of payments. Given the 
significance of oil revenues in the country's national income accounts and the 
Kingdom's high marginal propensity to import, x should be relatively small. Other 
formulations (equations 8 -15) confirm these conclusions. 
(8)ABA = 1.60AGENAN - 0.21.t. GORFS - 0.08 
(15.05) (-4.12) (-0.09) 
r2 = 0.9515; F 117.60 
(9)AMB 0.39AGENAN + 0.05.A.GORFS - 0.09 
(10.34) (2.44) (-6.28) 
r2 = 0.9340; F = 84.88 
(10).t.BA 1.40A GEN AN - 0.92 
(9.89) (-0.74) r2 = 0.8827; F = 97 .82 
(ll)AMB 0 .43 .t. GEN AN + 0.09 
(10.88) (0.26) r2 = 0.9011; F = 118.44 
(12) BA 1.22GENAN -2.73 
(27.76) (-2.72) r2 = 0.9834; F = 770.49 
(13)ABA 1.52AGENAN - 0.17./).0GDPN + 0.07 
(11.39) (-2.45) (0.05) 










r2 = 0.9973; F =2591.44 
0.33 AGENANL + 0.21 
(7 .30) (0.85) 
r2 = 0.9611; F = 173.05 
Some further justification for this finding might be sought on the ground of in-
terpreting the negative influence of oil revenue on the change in monetary base as an 
indication of the action of monetary authorities in sterilizing the impact of foreign 
reserves in monetary base. 
To illustrate this point of view further, it is of interest to analyze mdre precisely 
the behavior of the Saudi Arabian monetary authorities in their attempt to offset the 
impact of foreign reserves on monetary base. An estimate of the degree to which the 
monetary authorities adjust the domestic component of monetary base to changes in 
the external component can be obtained from regressing the change in monetary 
base (MB) and adjusted monetary base (BA) an SAMA's foreign assets (SFA) on the 
change in SAMA's foreign assets (ASFA). 
(16).1.(MB-SFA) = -0.85.1.SFA + 0.40 
(-51.97) (0.26) 
r2 = 0.9948; F 2700.52 
(17).1.(BA - SFA) -0.74.1.SFA + 2.52 
(-6.46) (0.87) 
r2 = 0. 7486; F = 41.68 
According to these estimates (equations 16 & 17), the Saudi Arabian monetary 
authorities on the average adjust the domestic component of the monetary base by 
85 rials out of each 100 rial change in foreign reserves, and the domestic component 
of the adjusted monetary base by about 74 rials out of each 100 rial change in 
foreign reserves. These results clearly indicate that the Saudi Arabian monetary 
authorities have been relatively successful in sterilizing movements in for.eign 
reserves. This conclusion is certainly open to question. 
It should be noted that part of the negative impact of the variation in foreign 
reserve on domestic component of monetary base can be attributed to the fact that 
the oil revenue, by nature, affects both the domestic and external components of the 
monetary base; i.e. any increase in the oil revenue increases the foreign reserves held 
by SAMA while at the same time, given °the level of government expenditure, 
decreases the claims of the central bank over the government. 
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This automatic sterilization process is of utmost importance in understanding the 
nature and the mechanism of monetary policy in Saudi Arabia. However, it cannot 
be denied that the conscious actions of the central bank mainly through the exercise 
of its control over the co!llmercial banks, such as changes in legal reserves re-
quirements, changes in advance and discounts to the banks and so on have been 
quite effective in offsetting the movements of foreign reserves on the domestic 
component of monetary base. 
The higher estimate (0-85) for SFA obtained when regressed on the monetary 
base (as compared with 0. 74 when regressed on the adjusted base) is partial evidence 
of the effectiveness of SAMA in this regard. This follows from the fact that the 
amount of banks' borrowing from SAMA is included in the definitions of the 
monetary base (MB), while excluded from the adjusted monetary base (BA). 
However, granting the imperfection of instruments of monetary policy, there may 
still be a considerable degree of sterilization. Ultimately, the question is an empirical 
one, and the evidence presented seems to tentatively indicate that the Saudi 
monetary authorities have been somewhat successful in neutralizing balance of 
payments fluctuations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A second important conclusion emerging from the analysis was the significant 
contribution of the monetary base to the growth of money stock. A complete 
understanding of the process of money supply determination in Saudi Arabia thus 
ultimately requires an ;malysis of the factors determining the growth rate of 
monetary base. 
Most of the literature on the interaction between domestic and international 
components of the money supply deals with developed countries and whether, given 
their high degree of capital market integration, central banks can exercise effective 
control over the money supply. Advocates of the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments contend that central bank control is limited by the fact the domestic 
component of the money supply will tend to be offset by counterbalancing foreign 
exchange flows. 
While the capital markets in Saudi Arabia are certainly not as closely integrated 
with the rest of the world as are those of many of the advanced countries, the degree 
of control over the domestic component of the monetary base and thus SAMA's 
ability to sterilize reserve flows has been questioned on the grounds that its in-
struments of monetary policy available are very limited in their effectiveness. 
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